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PRICE UNCERTAINTY AND THE EXHAUSTIVE FIRM 
In an earlier edition of this journal [2) the risk-neutral 
exhaustive1 firm's reactions to various tax-subsidy schemes were 
explored. Sandmo [10) analyzed the output effects of uncertainty on 
risk-averse competitive firms and derived comparative statics results 
dependent on attitudes towards risk, In this paper, we examine the 
risk-averse exhaustive firm and find: (1) some results are indepen-
dent of risk aversion assumptions; (2) comparative statics results 
differ from the no resource constraint case; and (3) results depend 
on the relative magnitude of the discount rate. and fixed costs. It 
is assumed that capital markets are imperfect, or, alternatively, that 
if perfect capital markets exist, firms do not have access to them; 
otherwise risk-aversion would not be operative relative to production 
decisions as firms would simply extract the resource so as to maximize 
the discounted present value of profits and then go to the capital 
market to obtain their desired income stream. ·This assumption seems 
to closely approximate real world situations for some resource indus-
tries; in particular the coal industry is characterized by a predomi-
nance of equity funding, particularly for smaller firms, indicating 
inaccessibility to capital markets. We find here that even in a simple 
model, lack of access to perfect capital markets leads to ambiguities 
and qualitative differences vis-a-vis the risk-neutral fynn. 
1The modifier exhaustive is employed to designate the price-taker 
facing a resource constraint while competitive is used in its received 
sense (i.e., a p�ife-tak�r facing no resource constraints). 
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The analysis is developed step-wise with increasing complexity 
in order to illustrate the fundamental concepts. We focus on the role 
of concave utility; cor.cave utility drives the results, and, while 
price uncertainty is the source of risk aver sion here, it may arise 
from other forms of uncertainty or even other manifestations of 
price uncertainty. The deterministic case is presented first for 
later comparison. Concave utility is then introduced in the absence 
of price uncertainty. Finally the case of price uncertainty and 
risk aversion is considered. A summary integrates and interprets the 
results in the text. Proofs of theorems are all relegated to the 
Appendix. 
I. The Deterministic Case 
The theory of exhaustible resources has been elaborated by Hotelling 
[6], Scott [12], Gordon [3], Smith [13], Cummings and Burt [3], Kuller 
and Cummings [7], Schulze [11] and by a number of authors in a recent 
symposium [15]. Some of these results are reproduced for comparison with 
cases to be examined later. 
Letting x(t) be rate of extraction, C[x(t)], the costs of producing 
x(t); p(t), the price of output
2 
and K the total stock of reserves, the 
problem is to maximize aggregate profits , V(1T), where 
(I.l) V (1T) 
T -rt fe [px-C(x)]dt 
0 
2we assume that market price is independent of remaining reserves 
and not directly dependent on time; while this does not preclude de­
pendence on market output we find that the ambiguity of result s in the 
analysis of the firm sugges t s  a market analysis would not be too re­
warding . 
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subject to 
(I. 2) y -x, y (O) K, y (T) 0 
y (t) being the reserves remaining at time t, and T being the date of 
depletion. This.is a standard variational problem, and necessary
conditions
.
require that along the optimal path, xd 
(I. 3) -rt e [ p-C' (x)] A. 
where A. is the (constant) multiplier associated with (I.2), and trans-
versality conditions require that, for t = T, 
(I. 4) C(x) x 
where C'(x) = .£..Q ax 
C' (x) 
It is implicitly assumed that costs consist of both 
variable and fixed components and fixed costs may be avoided through 
exit from the industry.
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As usual, it is supposed that C is monotonic-
ally increasing and convex. For the case of a zero discount rate (I. 3) 
and (I.4) require that optimal production occurs at the point of minimum 
average cost. Rather than maximizing profit per time period, producers 
maximize profit per ton of output (average profit) and' in this manner 
attain a global maximum for the profits attributable to their stock of
reserves. 
3
Fixed .costs of this sort were identified by Smith [14]. When a 
positive rate of discount is employed, fixed costs are not 
problematical (see Burness [2]). 
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The reaction of the exhaustive firm to various tax-subsidy policies 
differ from the traditional comp.etitive results. 4 Propositions 1.1-1.3 
present the deterministic results for the exhaustive f irm5 
Proposition I.l: Suppose the producers of a non-renewable resource is
a value maximizer; the imposition of a franchise law (constant over 
time) results in hastened depletion� 
Proposition I.2: Suppose the producer of a non-renewable resource is 
a value maximizer:(i) if fixed costs are positive and the discount rate
is zero, the imposition of a severance tax (constant over time and of 
either ad valorem or unit type). causes no change in extraction plans; 
(ii) if fixed costs are non-negative and the discount rate is positive, 
the imposition of a severance tax results in postponed depletion. 
Proposition I. 3: Suppose the producer of a non-renewable resource is a 
value maximizer: (i) if fixed costs are positive and the discount rate 
is zero, the imposition of a profits tax (constant over time) causes no
change in extraction plans; (ii) if fixed costs are non-negative anq 
the discount rate is positive, the imposition of a profits tax results 
in postponed depletion. 
Figures I-1 through. I-3 depict these results
,
. Proofs and interpre-
tations of these propositions plus their generalizations to the case 
where the rate of taxation is variable can be found in Burness [2]. 
4we suppose that the exhaustive firm accepts prices as parametric
thus endowing it wit h one dimension analagous to the competitive para­
digm. We do not specify the entry-exit properties as they �.re not ger­
mane. to our analysis. However, in view of t he irreversible nature of
capital outlays for exhaustive firms, the high degree of capital in­
tensity and t he presence of uncertainty, one suspects. that entry and 
exit may not be free. Hendry [5] has some observations on t.his matter.5
since subsidies can be viewed as negative taxes, results are pre-
s�nted for tax policies exclusively. 
x 
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x 
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Ttax T t 
Figure I.la: The effect of a fran­
chise tax on a value maximizer 
F > o·and r = 0. 
pre and post tax 
T t 
Figure I.2a: The effect of a sever­
ance tax on a value maximizer: 
F > 0 and r = 0. 
pre and post tax 
T 
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Figure I.3a: The effect of a profit 
tax on a value maximizer: F>O and r=O. 
T tax 
i 
T 
(F=O) 
t 
Figure I.lb: The0 effect of a franchise 
tax on a value maximizer: F > 0 and 
r > 0. 
• t 
T (=oo if F = 0) 
Figure I.2b: The effect of a severance 
tax on a value maximizer: F > 0 and r > 0. 
'--��������������--''--��---�t 
T (=oo if F=O ) 
Figure I.3b: The effect of a profit tax on 
a value maximizer: F>O and r>O. 
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II. Utility Maximization
For purposes of comparison we first recall the utility maximizing 
paradigm for a competitive (no resource constraint) producer. 
A. No Resource Restraint 
While Sandmo's analysis was essentially static, it is easily 
dynamized, and in fact, the stati.c formulation is representative of the 
dynamic problem since, under the assumptio� of stationary period-utility, 
behavior is the same in all time periods. If the aggregate utility of 
profits is given by 
(II . 1) 
.. 
-rt· · 
W ="Je u[TI (t)] dt 
0 
then utility maximizing competitive output must satisfy 
(II. 2) u' (TI) [p - C' (x)] 0 
where a prime denotes differentiation.
6 
Since the marginal utility of
income is positive, (II.2) requires that price equals marginal cost. 
Consequently competitive utility maximizing output equals competitive 
profit maximizing output in all time periods. 
B. An Exhaustible Resource 
The presence of a resource constraint fundamentally alters the 
formulation. To avoid some ethical problems associated with resource 
depletion we assume that the resource under consideration is inessential: 
it is not necessary for survival. Also the firm's inability to gain 
6Throughout, it is assumed that u (TI) is twice continuously differ­
entiable, possesses a third derivative, and that u(TI) is monotonic 
increasing and concave. 
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access to perfect capital markets implies that the producer maximizes 
the utility of profits. If such access were available the producer 
would merely maximize the present value of earnings and borrow or lend 
as necessary to achieve his desired consumption pattern. 
Two distinct intervals of production can be imagined. On the first, 
positive production and non-negative profits are observed while on the 
second, after the resource is depleted, zero profits and the associated 
level of utility are experienced. Thus the producer chooses an extraction 
path, x, and depletion date, T, so as to maximize. 
(II.3) W* 
T -rt -rt 
Je u (TI) dt + J e u dt 
0 T o 
subject to (I.2), where T is the date of resource depletion� and
u 0 u (TI) I TI=O.
Necessary conditions require that for an interior solution 
(II.4) e-rtu' (TI) [p-C' (x)] =A
along the utility maximizing arc, x, while transversality conditions 
require that 
(II. 5) 
u (TI)-u0 -rt 
e { u' (TI) [p-C' (x)] - }= 0 
x 
for t = T. For the case of a zero discount rate equation (II.5) states 
that the marginal utility of prof its obtained from incremental changes 
7
Equation (II.3) implicitly suggests that the firm is infinitely 
lived.· While no definitive answer can be given one must admit the 
possibility of finite lifetime. The argument to be presented below is 
still valid provided T*, the date the firm ceases to exist, exceeds T, 
the date of optimal resource depletion. However if T*<T then the 
problem becomes a fixed horizon problem and many of the results differ.
The anomaly arises from the assumed absence of capital markets • .  We 
restrict the analysis to the case where T<T*� ... 
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in production must equal average utility (per unit of output);· (II.5) 
also characterizes a maximum of average utility (per unit of output) and 
this maximum is unique, with dep"letion occurring in a finite time _inter-
val (for r 0 and F>O). Note that the tenets of von Newman-Morgenstern 
measurable utility are satisfied, for if v(1T) = au('li) + b, then along the
. 
utility maximizing arc 
(II. 6) e-rTv'(1T) [p�c'(x)] 
-rT v(1T)-v e o x 
and (II.6) reduces immediately to (II.5). 
III. Concave Utility 
The assumption of risk aversion is tantamount to the presence of 
concave utility and uncertainty. In this section we employ a convenient 
separation and consider concave utility when price is known. This 
approach-is followed primarily for pedagogical purposes as it indicates 
further lack of symmetry with the competitive paradigm; in particular, 
utility maximizing exhaustive output generally differs from profit 
maximizing exhaustive output, while for the competitive case, utility 
and profit maximizing output are identical (as shown in II.A)� To . 
unify the a�alysis we maintain the neoclassical. assumption on utility 
functions; i.e., lim u'.(z) = 00 and lim u'-(z) = O. 
z-+o Z-+"'1 
A. Utility Maximizing Output 
Since u is unique up to linear monotonic transformations, the 
value of u
0 
i's in essence arbitrary. Consequently we set u
0 
0 so as· 
to avoid carrying a constant through the analysis. In this case (II.5) 
becomes 
(III. l) 
for t T. 
u' (1T) [p-C' (x)] =
· u(1T)" 
·x 
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Theorem III. l: Suppose the producer of a non-renewable resource is. a 
utility maximizer (u"<O). Then the utility maximizing producer post­
pones.depletion relative to the value maximizing producer� Specifically 
(i} if fixed costs (F) are zero and the discount rate (r). is positive 
and xd(t
) and _x(t) are the optimal value and utility -maximizing ex­
traction schedules, there exist� a t* quite that xd(
t)>x(�)
_ 
for t<t* 
and xd(t)<x(t) f
or t>t*; (ii) if F>O and r=O, then xd(t) = xd, 
x(t) = x and xd>x; (iii) if F>O, >O and Td and 
Tare the optimal 
value and utility maximizing depletion dates, then Td<T and xd(Td)>
x(T). 
In addition if x and xd· intersect then xd intersects x from above. 
Figure III.l(i) through III.l(iii) depict these results. Note 
that the ultimate relationship of the two paths depends on, the relative 
.magnitude of fixed costs and the discount rate. 
Corollary III.l: Let RA(1T) = -u11(1T)/u(1T), the measu
re of absolute risk 
aversion. I£ fixed costs are zero, a more risk avers·e producer, in the 
sense that R
1 
A (1T)>R
2 
A
(1T), tends to postpone extraction relative to the 
plans of a ·less risk averse producer; i.e. , there exists at* such that 
A Z A l . A2 Al x (t)>x (t) for t<t* and x (t)<x (t) for t>t*. 
This result is depicted in Figure III. l(iv). 
8A result similar to this has been sho'wn by Lewis [8] in the 
context of an infinite horizon discrete time planning model. · 
x 
x 
x 
x
d 
xl 
x2 
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x
d 
(value maximizing) 
x (utility maximizing) 
t 
Figure 111.l(i): Value and utility maximizing paths when F = 0 and . 
r > 0 (T = oo ) , 
x
d 
(value maximizer) 
x 
. . . . 
T
d T 
t 
Figure 111.l(ii): Value and u tility maximizing pa ths when 
F > 0 and r = 0. 
x 
11 
x2 (less risk averse) 
t 
Figure 111.l(iv): Effect of risk aversion on discounted utility 
maximizing path: F = 0, r > 0. 
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B. Franchise Tax 
A franchise tax is a lump sum tax levied each period a firm remains 
in the industry; consequently it may be avoided in a dynamic framework 
through exit from the industry. As the tax tends to increase profit max-
imizing extraction rates (Proposition I.l) and simultaneously lower 
profits, one is tempted to infer that the utility maximizing firm's 
reaction is dependent upon the nature of risk aversion. However, the 
conclusions of Theorem III.2 hold for increasing or decreasing absolute 
(or relative) risk aversion. 
Theorem III. 2: Suppose that the producers of a non-renewable resource 
maximizes discounted utility of profits where the discount rate is positive .. 
Then a franchise tax imposed at the rate B per time period hastens depletion; 
specifically if x, T and S,TB represent the pre and post tax extraction 
A A A 
rates and depletion dates, respectively, then TB <T and S(TB) > x(T). 
Moreover S(t) > x(t) for t8[0,TB]. 
Corollary III.2: If the producer of a non-renewable resource is a utility 
maximizer, the discount rate is zero and fixed costs are positive, then 
the imperative of a franchise tax hastens depletion; specifically 
x(t) = x, a constant S(t) = B, a constant and B > x. 
Theorem III.2 and its corollary reinforce the deterministic result 
(Proposition II.l), indicating that concave utility causes no qualitative 
change in the reaction of an exhaustive firm to a franchise tax. Figures 
III.l(i) and III.2(ii) depict the franchise tax results. 
C. Severance Tax 
In practice, severance taxes are usually of the ad valorem type, 
but the analysis is presented in terms of the unit type for simplicity. 
The results are qualitatively the same for either case. 
x 
. B (TB) 
x(t) 
x 
Figure III.2(i): 
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(F = O) 
-
..... ---�--
T
B 
T t 
Utility maximizing pre and post franch"ise 
tax extraction paths : F > 0 and r > 0 
(T = "' when F = 0) . 
S (post tax) 
x (pre tax) 
Figure III . 2(ii): 
TB ·t 
Utility maximizing pre and post franchise 
tax extraction paths: F > 0 and r = 0.
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Proposition I.2 states that a severance tax will postpone depletion 
for a value.maximizer for the case of zero fixed costs and a positive 
discount rate. The following theorem indicates that, under plausible 
conditions, a severance tax will have just the opposite effect on the 
decisions of a utility maximizer. 
Theorem III.3a: Suppose that producers are utility maximizers and 
future utilities are discounted at a positive rate. In addition, suppose 
that fixed costs are zero and variable costs are linear. If absolute 
risk aversion is constant then the imposition of a severance tax at the 
rate A per unit of resource extracted results ixi. hastened depletion; 
specifically, there exists a t* such that a (t) > x (t) for t < t* and 
a (t) < x (t) for t > t*, where x and � are the pre and post tax depletion 
rates. 
When fixed costs are positive and the discount rate is zero, 
Proposition I.2 asserts that a constant severance tax causes no change in 
optimal extraction plans. Since a severance. tax reduces economic rents9, 
one would expect the effect of such a tax on the utility maximizers 
optimal plans would depend on his attitude toward risk. However, the 
following result is adduced independent of assumptions on measures of 
risk aversion. 
Theorem III.3b: Suppose that producers are utility maximizers, the 
discount rate is zero and fixed costs are positive. A severance tax 
results in increased output and advanced depletion; specifically, 
9
Fo� a value maximizer with 
rate, the firm's supply cur'7e is 
of average cost. 
positive fixed costs and zero discount 
vertical with its base at the minimum 
15 
a (t) a > x x(t) for t£[0,TA]. 
Figures III. 3a and IIJ . 3b depict the results. 
Theorems III.3a and III. 3b and Proposition I.2 tend to challenge 
one rationale for a severance tax . Traditionally, it is argued that, 
due to inelasticity of demand for exhaustible resources, the burden of a 
severance tax is shifted primarily to the consumer; to the extent that 
the resoi.u:ce is exported, the tax is also. Present results contradict 
this argument. Proposition I. 2 indicates no change in output in the 
deterministic case, and consequently the tax is borne through reduction in 
economic rents. In the face of producer risk aversion, results are even 
more striking as output rises.. In either case, the tax is borne by 
the industry, at least in the short run. 
D. Profit Tax 
Proposition I. 3 states that a value maximizer with zero fixed costs 
and a positive discount rate postpones production when faced with a 
constant profits tax. The following theorem shows that· utility maxi-
mizer with constant absolute risk aversion will accelerate depletion. 
Theorem III.4a: Suppose that producers are utility maximizers and that 
fixed costs are zero and the discount rate is positive. If absolute 
risk aversion is constant
10
, the imposition of a profits tax at the rate 
D per dollar at profits at a given time results in hastened depletion; 
i. e., .there exists a t* such that ll (t) < x (t) for t < t* and li (t) > x (t) 
f.or t > t* where x and Ii are the pre and post tax extraction paths. 
lOBoth this theorem and Theorem III. 3a hold for aRA/au > Q.as well; 
however this would be at least a tenuous assumption and hence it is not 
made. 
x 
a (0 
x(O 
x 
16 
a.{post tax) 
---
---
t* 
Figure III.3a: Utility maximizing pre and post severance tax 
-extraction paths: F = 0 and r > 0. 
a (post tax 
x (pre tax) 
TA T 
Figure III.3b: Utility maximizing pre and post severance 
tax extraction paths : F >' 0 and r = 0. 
t 
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Proposition I.3 also asserts that a value maximizer with positive 
fixed costs and a zero discount rate does not alter extraction plans 
in the face of a constant profits· tax. We find below that .the utility 
maximizer's reaction depends on quantitative aspects of attitudes toward 
risk • 
. Theorem·III.4b: Suppose that producers are utility maximizers,.fixed 
costs are positive and the dis·count rate is .zero. Le.t: the income 
elasticity of utility, E1(1r) = dln u(1r)/dln"lr, and the income elasticity 
of marginal utility (measure of relative risk aversion), � (11") 
-dln u;(TI')/dln"lr, satisfy 
(III.23) E1(p) + �(y1r) <l 
for yE[O,l]. Then the imposition of a profit tax results in postponed 
11 � - -
depletion ; in particular, since r = O, x(t) = x and o(t) � o, and 
;s < x. 
These two results are depicted in Figures III.4a and III.4b, respec-. 
tively. When fixed costs··are present and r > 0 one can only conjecture 
the effect of a profit tax on exhaustion plans. Given the st"ated assump-
tions on the nature of. risk aversion, it seems that generally extraction 
is .postponed, but the exact: manner in which this oc�urs. dep�n-ds. the 
relative magnitudes of the discount rate and fixed costs, as Theorems 
III.4a and III.4b suggest.
11Note that if E1(1r) + �(11") � 1, the opposite result holds. 
x 
x 
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x (pre tax) 
t* t 
Figure III.4a: Utility maximizing pre and post tax extraction 
plans for a prof it c tax: F = 0 and r > 0. 
x (pre tax 
8 (post tax) 
T To t
Figure III.4b: Utility maximizing pre and post tax extraction 
plans for a prof it tax : ·F > 0 and r = 0. 
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IV. Risk Aversion 
A. Risk-Averse Output 
While the presence of risk aversion as due to price.uncertainty intro-
duce some ambiguities into the analysis, to some extent they can be 
resolved; price uncertainty causes no substantive alternation of the 
results obtained for concave utility alone. In contrast, the firm facing 
no resource constraint alters optimal behavior only after both concave 
utility and price uncertainty are present. In this section we examine 
the manner in which previous results generalize when price uncertainty 
is present. 
Price uncertainty enters as an additive stochastic t
.
erm 
·
appended 
to the demand function; the stochastic term has distribution function <Ii. 
Deterministic price, pd, is related to expected price, E<!i(p), by the 
rule, E<!i (p) = E (p) pd . Alternatively one could view the deterministic 
value maximizer as a risk-neutral expected utility maximizer; one can 
quickly verify that the behavior of both is identical. 
When producers are risk-averse, they maximize the expected utility 
f f. 12 o pro its 
(IV.l) E(W) = J e-rtE[u(w)]dt 
0 
subject to(t.2). Necessary conditions require that along the optimal 
arc, xs' 
(IV. 2) A =  e-rt E [u' (w) (p-C')] 
where A is the constant shadow price of the resource, and that f or t 
(IV .3) {E [u (w)] - E[u' (rr) (p-C')]x } e-rt. = O 
T, 
12
we must assume that storage of extracted resources is not possible. 
See Leurs [9] for an analysis of extraction rules when storage is 
permitted in a deterministic setting. 
20 
Theorem IV.la: Suppose that producers are risk-averse expected utility 
maximizers where the discount rate is positive and fixed costs are zero. 
If g (11) = 11u' (11) is convex, then .the risk-averse expected utility maxi-
mizer postpones depletion vis-a-vis the value maximizer (or, alternarively, 
the risk-neutral expected utility maximizer) ; specifically, there 
exists a t* such that xs(t) < x (t) for t < t* and xs (t) > x (t) for t > t*. 
Theorem IV.lb: Suppose producers are risk-averse expected utility max-
imizers and that the discount rate is zero while fixed costs are positive. 
The risk-averse expected utility maximizer postpones depletion vis-a-vis 
the value maximizer; specifically, xs (t) =XS, xd (t) = xd and XS < xd. 
Moreover, if g (11) = 11u' (11) is convex, then xsE[x, xd] where x = x(t) . 
Figures IV.la and IV.lb depict these results. As in Theorem III.l, 
if fixed costs are positive and the discount rate is positive, the 
intersection of xs and xd cannot be unambiguously determined. Intersection 
or non-intersection is dependent on the relative magnitudes of fixed 
costs and ·the discount rate. However if intersection occurs, xd intersects 
x from above. s 
Corollary IV . 1: When F > 0 and r = 0, decreasing absolute and relative 
risk aversion imply that XS E[x, xd] . 
� 
The corollary notwithstanding, xs dx, xd
] is compatible with in-
creasing relative risk-aversion as well, which is reassuring since a 
strong case for either increasing or decreasing relative-risk aversion 
cannot be established. These results are somewhat counter-intuit:hre 
since risk aversion might be expected to diminish output unambiguously , 
as in the competitive case. However, there is no clear parallel to the 
no-resource-constraint results, as price uncertainty and concave utility 
x 
x 
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(risk averse) 
t* t 
Figure IV.la: Risk-averse and risk neutral paths: 
" 
F = 0 and r > 0. 
xd (risk neutral) 
x s (risk averse) 
x (utility max imizing) 
t-��������������-;-����-;..��--
T
d 
T 
s T t 
Figure IV.lb: Risk-averse, value� and utility maximizing 
paths: F > 0 and r z O. 
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are non-trivially separable in the exhaustive case. Neverthel ess, . it 
is enl ightening to distinguish the separate effects of concave util ity 
and price uncertainty (risk aversion) on an exhaustive firm. 
B. Franchise Tax 
Under risk aversion the franchise tax results g eneral ize in the 
following manner. 
Theorem IV.2 : Suppose that resource price is stochastic and producers a..:-e 
risk-averse ·expected util ity maximizers, where fixed costs are non-
negative and the discount rate is positive. Moreover, suppose that the 
distribution of p.rice is such that p > C' (x*) where x* satisfies 
x*C'(x*) = C(x*). Then a franchise tax, B · per time period, results in 
hastened depletion; specifically if·xs' Ts and $s' TB are the pre and 
post tax extraction rates and depl etion dates, then TB < Ts ' and 
$(TB).
> xs(Ts) and $(t) > . xs(t) for tE[O, TB] .
Corollary IV. 2: Suppose that the hypothesis. of Theorem IV.2 holds
with the except ion that F > 0 and r = O. 
and B > x • s s 
Then x (t) = x , $ (t) = B s s s . s 
Figures IV. 2a and IV.2b depict these results. 
C. Severance Tax 
Theorem III.3a does not general ize directly when risk aversion due 
to price uncer�ainty is present. However Theorem III.3b can be extended 
in the following manner. 
Theorem IV.3(i) : ·  Suppose that producers are risk-averse expected util ity 
maximizers where fixed c osts are positive and the discount rate is zero. 
x 
x 
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tax) 
T
B 
-----
T s t 
Figure IV.2a: Risk-averse pre and post franchose tax extraction 
paths : F >. 0 and r > 0 (Ts = 00 when F = 0). 
·B (p ost tax) 
s 
x (pre tax) · 
s 
T
B 
T s t "
F igure IV.2b: Risk-averse pre and post franchise tax extraction 
pahts� F > 0 and r • O. 
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If a severance tax is imposed at the rate A per unit of output extracted, 
and the distribution of price is such that p > C'(x*) + A, where 
x*C'(x*) = C(x*), then depletfon is hastened; in particular, x (t) 
s· x s 
and Cl (t) > a Where·X and a are the pre and post tax extraction paths 
s s s s 
anda >x. s . s 
Theorem IV.3(ii) presents a local result analogous to that of 
Theorem IV.3(i) without restricting the distribution of price. 
Theorem IV.3(ii): Suppose that producers are risk-averse expected utility 
maximizers where fixed costs are positive and the discount rate is zero. 
If A is a severance tax rate then ax /<lA > 0. s 
Figure IV.3 depicts these results; 
D. Profit Tax 
As with Theorem III.3a, Theorem IV.3a does not generalize. However 
Theorem III.4b can be extended in the following manner. 
Theorem IV.4: Suppose that iri the presence of price uncertainty producers 
are risk-averse expected utility maximizers where fixed costs are positive 
and· the discount rate is zero. If EI(TI) + �(TI) � 1 and the distribution 
of price is such that p > C'(x*) where x*C'(x*) = C(x*), then the imposi-
tion of a prof its tax at the rate D results in postponed depletion; 
specifically, x (t) = x , a (t) = 5 where x and 5 are the pre and s s s s s s 
post tax depletion rates and 6 < x . s s 
Figure IV.4 depicts this result. However we should be quick to
note that EI(TI) + �(TI) > 1 implies the opposite result, namely, 6 > x , s . s 
While Arrow (lJ argues for certain limiting values of the measure of 
relative risk aversion.little can be said about its value at intermediate 
x 
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a5 (post tax) 
xs (pre tax) 
T T t 
a s 
Figure IV.3: Risk-ave·rse pre and post severance tax 
extraction paths: F > 0 and r • 0.
x 
x
s 
(pre tax) 
6 (post tax) s 
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T 
s T s 
t 
Figure ·IV. 4: Risk-averse pre and po st prof it tax 
extraction paths: F > 0 and r = 0 
(E1(n) + RR(n) 2 1). 
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incomes • .  Consequently the role of a profit tax is difficult· to 
assess here as well as when. price ?Ilcertainty is absent. 
V. Summary of Results and Conclusion 
Generally risk aversion tends to postpone production plans for an 
extractive firm. However the actual configuration of. optimal path under
risk-aversion vis-a-vis· a value maximizing plan depends on assumptions 
concerning fixed costs (F) and the discount rate (r). When F > 0 and 
r = O, ·the value maximizing plan exceeds the utility maxim�zing plan until 
the former plan results in resource depletion (Figure III. l(ii)). When 
F = 0 and r > 0, the value maximizing plan is larger initially, but the 
utility maximizing plan is larger terminally (Figure III.l(i)). Clearly 
then when both F > 0 and r > 0, the intersection or non-intersection of 
the two paths will depend on the relative magnitudes of F and r. (Figure 
III.l(iii)). One would expect that when fixed costs are large relative
to the discount rate, the schedules would not intersect and v.ice-versa. 
The postponement of depletion caused by risk aversion is intuitively 
plausible: risk aversion causes an evening out of the production schedule, 
or, alternativ.ely, a spreading of more equal incomes over a longer 
horizon. 
Figure V.l summarizes the effects of constant franchise, severance 
and·profit taxes under a variety of scenarios. Generally these results 
speak for themselves, but several interesting observations can be made. 
First, .when no resource constraint is present, risk aversion alters the 
standard tax results in an intuitively plausible way under pla�sible 
Firm Type F & r 
No Resource 
F > 0 Constraint: 
Value 
Maximizer r > 0 
No Resource F > 0 Constraint: 
Expect ed 
Utility r > 0 
Maximizer 
F > 0 
Extractive r = 0 
Firm: Value 
Maximizer 
F > 0 
r > 0 
F > 0 
r = 0 
Extractive 
Firm: Utility 
Maximizer 
F > 0 
r > 0 
F > 0 
Extractive r = O 
Firm : 
Expected 
Utility 
F = 0 Maximizer 
r > 0 
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I II 
Franchise Tax Severance Tax 
(B = O) (A= O) 
Reduced No change production 
Reduced Reduced 
production production 
CRA (11) ) --- < 0 al[ 
CRA (11) ) --- < 0 a11 
Depletion 
accelerated No change 
D epletion Depletion 
accelerated postponed 
Depletion Depletion 
accelerated accelerated 
Depletion Depletion 
accelerated accelerated 
(F ::'.: O) ( <lRA (11) = o) 
d'lf 
D epletion Depletion 
accelerated accelerated 
Depletion 
accelerated Undetermined 
Figure V.l: Summary of Tax Results 
III 
Profit Tax 
(D = O) 
No change A 
Increased or 
reduced produc-
tion as B 
a� (11) > --- < 0 
a11 
No change c 
Depletion 
postponed D 
Depletion 
postponed or E 
accelerated as 
E1(1T) + �(11) � 1 
Depletion 
postponed F 
cR��11) = 0) 
D epletion 
postponed or 
accelerated as G 
E1(11) + �(11) � 1 
Undetermined H 
29 
economic hypotheses (rows A and B; these are the Sandmo [10] results). 
Second, when a resource constraint exists, the value maximizing results 
can be defended intuitively (rows C· and D; these and related results are 
found in [2]). However, when an extractive firm maximizes utility or 
expected utility, intuition is no longer a reliable guide and ambiguities 
appear (rows E·- H). In particular, comparing the element in row C and 
column II (denoted C-II) with E-II, a severance tax results in accelerated. 
depletion when risk aversion exists (fixed costs being positive and the 
discount rate zero) , but causes no change in the value maximizers output. 
When discounting occurs at a positive rate and fixed costs are zero, a 
severance tax causes accelerated depletion under risk aversion and post­
poned depletion for the value maximizer (compare D-II and F-II). For 
a profit tax when the discount rate is zero and there are positive fixed 
costs value maximizing path is unaltered, while under risk aversion 
depletion may be accelerated, postponed or unchanged (compare C-III with 
E-II I  or G-III). These incongruencies are not problematic in themselves 
but become so in light of the tenuous hypotheses concerning risk attitudes 
under which the risk aversion results are derived. 
Also crucial is the explicit assumption of imperfect capital markets. 
In order that the effect of various tax policies on the production · 
decisions of extractive firms might be anticipated, perhaps a necessary 
precondition for policy would be firms' accessibility to capital markets. 
Under these conditions firms would just be value maximizers and achieve 
their desired income streams through the capital market; when firms 
are value maximizers there is little trouble in assessing their probable 
reaction to taxes and subsidies. In the coal industry, for example, 
30 
. many firms, especially smaller ones, are reliant primarily on equity 
financ1ng and the consequent lack .of capital availability hqs frequently 
been singled out as a deterrant to achieving adequate produ�tion levels . 
This is certainly in keeping with the results presented here. Proposed
programs to give entering firms better access to debt markets· would 
promise to ameliorate the .situation. 
APPENDIX 
Proof  o f  Theorem III.l: We pro ve o nly parts (i) and (iii) as (ii) 
fo llo ws d irectly f rom the pro of of (iii) . 
(i) We f irst kno w that the utility maximizers d epletio n d ate i.·: 
infinite. To 'do this. suppose T is f inite. Transversality cond itio ns
require that 
(A.l) u' (1T) [p - C' (x) .]x = u(1T) 
which in.view o f  the neoclassical assumption and the concavity o f  u 
A A 
implies that x (T) = O. However x (T) � 0 and T finite violates the 
necessary conditions (II.4) . Hence T = 00 and, by the resource constraint, 
x(T) = 0.  If the cost f unction is neoclassical (i.e., lim C'(z) = 0 
�-
and lim C'(z ) = •) a similar technique shows that Td = •and xd(Td ) = 0 z+O 
as well. 
Diff erentiating the necessary co nditio ns {I.3) and (II.4) with
respect to t yield s, respectively, 
(A.2) 
and 
(A.3) 
x
d 
-r [p - C'(x) ] 
C"(x) 
� = -r[p-C'(x)] 2 RA(1T) [p-C'(x) ] + C " (x)
where RA(rr) is the measure of abso lute risk aversio n. For any t* such 
that x(t*) = xd(t* ) 
(A.4) id (t* ) '- x(t*) 
3 -r[p-C' (x) ] RA (1T ) 
C "(x) [ RA (1T) (p-C' {x) )
2 + C"(x)] 
< 0 
In view of the resource constraint and T = Td = m such a t* must exist 
and be unique, thus completing the proo f of (i) . 
A-2 
(iii) In view of the neoclassical assumption and the pr�sence of 
fixed costs it is clear that T and Td are finite. T ransversality condi­
tions f or the utility maximizers ar.e, for x = x(T) ; 
(A.5) u' (1T) [p-C' (x)] x = u(1T) 
. Subtracting u' (1T ) 1T f rom each side and d ividing by u1(1T) yield s 
(A.6) I - U (1T ) - 1T C(x) - xC (x) 
u' (1T ) 
Since u is concave, u1 (1T ) < u(1T) /1T, hence both sides.of (A. 6) are po sitive
so that x(T) < xd(Td). Co njoined with (A. 4) this implies that T >T d. Note
however that we are no t assured of the existence of a po int such as t*, 
but only that if such a po int . exists, xd intersects x f ro m  abo ve. 
Proof of Corollary III. l :  The pro o f  is immed iate in view of · the reso urce 
constraint, the inf inite depletion d ate, and equation (A.3) . 
Proo f o f  Theorem III.2: We first sho w that x(T) < B(TB) . If 1T 
px - C(x) and B > 0 then 
(A. 7) u( 1T- B) < 
A A 
x 
u (1T) 
x 
fo r x = x(T) . Also it is clear that 
(A. 8) u'(rr - B) [p:-C'(x) ]:::, u1(1T) [p-C'(x)] 
for x = x{T) . When the tax is imposed , 
{A. 9) u' (1T - B) [p-C' (x) ] - u(1T - B) = o. x 
for x = B{TB) .  In view of (A.7) and (A.8) 
(A.10) u1(1T - B) (p-C'(x) ] - u(rr - B) > o. 
x 
for x = x{T) . Denoting the left hand side of (A.10) as H(x), we also see 
that 
(A. 11) H' (x) 2 u"(1T - B) [p-C'{x}] - u'{1T - B) C"(x) - H (x) /x <O 
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for H(x) .'.: O. 
S(TB) 
> x(T).
Since H(x) ;. 0 implies x S(TB) by (A.9), clearly 
We now show that x and a do not intersect. Suppose to the contrary 
that there exists a t* such that x(t*) = S(t*). If A and AB are the pr� 
and post tax multipliers associated with the resource constraint then 
(A.12) �t I 
�t 
I AB(t*) = e u'(TI-B) (p-C'(x)] *> e u'(TI) (p-C'(x)] *=A(t*) . t=t t=t 
Differentiating the transversality .condition (A.9) with respect to B and 
solving for ax/aB yields 
(A.13) ax _ u" (TI-B) (p-C' )x - u' (TI-B) 
aB - . " ·  2 u (TI-B) (p-C') x - C"u' (TI-B)x 
Differentiating the left side of (A.12) with respect to B yields 
(A.14) - = e u" (TI-B) (p-c') ( (p-c') - -1] -u' (TI-B)C"-dA -rt { ax Clx. }dB aB ClB 
Substituting from (A.13) yields, for t=TB, 
(A.15) -= e B < 0dA -rT � -u' (TI-B)} dB x 
which contradicts (A.12). Hence S(t)> 
� 
x(t).for tE[O,TB]. In view of
the resource constraint this implies TB<T and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Theorem III.3a: Since fixed costs are zero, the post tax depletion 
date is infinite by a technique similar to that used in the first part of 
the proof of Theorem III.l. Necessary conditions for the pre and post 
tax problems are 
(A.16) 
and 
(A.17) 
A =  e-rt u'(TI)[p-C'(x)]
A = e -rt u' (TI-Ax) [p-C' (x) - A] A 
Differentiating these two expressions with respect to time, recalling that 
� = � A = 0, and solving for � and �. where x and a are the pre and post 
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tax optimal paths, yields 
(A.18) :. _ -r(p-C') x - �(TI)(p-C')z + C" 
and 
(A.19) Cl. = -r(p-C'-A) 
RA (TI-Ax) (p-C I -A)
2+ C" 
In view of the resource constraint and the infinite depletion date, x 
and a must intersect at some point t*. The linearity of C(x) implies 
that the expression for � - � at t* is 
(A. 20) � - � = -r(p-C')(p-C'-A)(R (TI-Ax)(p-C1-A) - R (TI)(p-C')]/D A A 
where D = RA(TI-
A
x)RA(TI)(p-C'-A)2(p-C')2 > 0. Since RA(TI-Ax) 
= RA(TI)
�RA*' (A.20) becomes 
(A. 21) � - � = -r(p-C')(p-C'-A)(-R *)A/D >O A 
Hence x intersects a from below, and the theorem is proved. 
Proof of Theorem III.3b: Observe that for TI>O 
(A.22) 
[du' (TI)/dx] 
d U(TI) 
� 
2 
u(TI) u"(TI) [p-C' (x)] - u' (TI) 
U (TI) 2 
Since TI > TI - Ax, where A is the tax rate, (A.22) implies 
(A.23) u1(TI) [p-C'(
x)] < u'(TI-Ax) [p-C'(x)-A] 
u(TI) - u(TI-Ax) 
< 0 
for x = x, where x is the pre tax optimal output rate. Letting 
a =  u(TI-Ax)/[u(tr)] when x = x, (A.23) can be rewritten as 
(A. 24) au'(TI) [p-C'(x)] < u'(TI-Ax) [p-C'(x)-A] 
for x = x. In addition 
(A.25) 
au(TI) = u(
TI-Ax) 
x x 
at x = x. In view of the necessary conditions, equations (A.24) and 
(�.25) imply 
(A.26 ) 
A-5 
G(x) = u '  (11-Ax) [ p -C' (x) -A] - u(
11-Ax) > 0 x 
at x = x.  If  ci is the optimal extraction rate after the imposition of 
the tax ,  .then G(a) = 0. This, together with the fact t hat 
(A.2 7 ) dG = u"(11 -Ax) [ p.:.C'(x) -A]
2 - u'(11 -Ax) C" (x) - G
(x) < 0 � x 
f or G (x) > 0 impl ies that a. > x.  
Pr oof of Theorem III . 4a :  Since f ixed costs a re zero both pre and post tax . 
depletion dates are inf inite. By the resource constraint there exist s  a 
t* such that x and o int ersect at t* . Note that 
(A. 28) 6 = -r_,(._p -_C"-'-')'-- ---­
RA (y11 )y (p-C1)
2 
+ C " 
Where y = 1 - D, so that 
(A. 29) � 6 = -r(p-C 1 )3 [RA(y11)y - RA(11) ] 
A 
2 I I  2 Where A = [RA(11 ) (p-C' ) + C ] [RA(y11 )y (p-C') + C" ] > 0 
Since RA(y11) = RA(11) = RA* '  (A.29) becomes 
(A.3 0) · � - 6 = -r(p-C1) 3 RA* (y -1) /6. > 0, which yiel d s  the d esired
resul t. 
Proof of Theorem III.4.b : The proo f is aided by use of the f ollowing 
lemma. 
Lemma : Suppose that u(11 ) is continuously d i f f erent ia bl e  with u ' (11) > ·  0 
and u1 1 (11 )  :: 0 .  If the income elasticity of util ity , EI(11) = dln u(11 )/dln11 ,
and the income ' ela sticity of marginal utility (mea sure of relative ris1 .  
aversion), �(1 ) = -dln u '  (11 ) /dln11 , sat isfy
(A.31) EI(y� )+_ �{y11 )  < 1 
f or ye [O , l ] then 
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{A. 32)  u (y11* )  u(11 ) :: u (y11 )  u(11*)
f or 11 E [ 0 , 11*] . 
We cont inue now with the· p.roof of the theo rem. Le:t 11 = px - C (x) , 
y = 1-D , where D is the tax rate, and 8 is the value of x such that 
T 
fu (y11 ) dt is max im i z ed subj ect t o  (I.2 ).
0 
Def ine b = [ u (y11 ) /u (11 ) ] I x = x .
Since u is unique up t o  a linear monotonic transformat ion , the maximum 
T -
.of J bu (11) dt subj ect to (I.2) st ill o ccur s at x .  Clearly
0 
(A. 3 3 )  
u (y11) _ 
= 
bu (11)
x x 
fo r x =. i .  By the Lemma 
(A. 34) b u(11) :: u(y11) 
f or 11 e [0 , 11 (x)] . Consequently 
(A.35) d u(y11)  < b du (11 ) . d11 - d11 
f or 11 close to 11(x). To see this suppose t here exist s. an n > 0 
f?UCh t hat 
(A. 36) du (y11) > b du (11) . d11 . d11 
f or 11 e [i1 - n ] , where ;:[ =  11 (x) . In t egrat ing both s id e s  of (A.3 6) bet ween 
11 - n · and if and evaluat ing in l ig ht of · the d ef inition of b yields
(A.37 ) u (y11 ) j - <b u(11 ) i -11-n 11 -n 
in contradict i on to (A.3 4); Hence (A. 3 5) holds.  
In view of (A.3 3 ) , (A. 3 5),  and the transversality cond �tio ns ( III. l) 
(A. 38) F(x) = u ' (y11 )  [p- C' (x)] - u(y11 )  < 0 x 
f or x = i .  Since F ( o ;  = O and 
(A. 39) F' (x) = u"(y11) y [p-C' (x) J 2  - u' (y'lf) C" (x) - F(x) < O . x -
in order that x and 8 yield maxima , then it follows t hat 8 < i a s
d esired . 
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Proof o f  Lemma : Expressio n (A.31)  can be manipulated and rewr itten as 
(A . 4 0 )  
. 2 u(y11 ) [ ynu" (yn ) + u '  (yn) ] - yn u ' (y11 )  
u (y11 ) 2 
f o r  11 > 0 and ye [ O , l]. Co nsequent ly 
(A , 41) yu' (yn ) < u' (n ) u(y11 )  - u (11 ) , 
Equat ion (A . 41 )  can be rewritten as 
,,!Yu' (yn )] 
"l u (yn )] > 0 
ay-
(A . 42 ) ynu'(yn ) u (11)  - nu' (11 ) u (y11 )  
2 
d [u (y11 )  
Ju (n ) < 0 
u (n ) 
Hence f o r  ye [ O , l ]  and 11 e [ 0, 11* ] 
(A . 43) u(yn *·) > u (y11 ) u (11 * )  - u (11 )  
� 
Since (A.43) can be rewrit ten as (A.32 ) t he proof is complet e .  
Proof of  Theo rem IV.la : As in Theo rem III.l(i) , t he deplet ion dat e  is 
inf init e when f ixed cost s are z ero . Henc e xs is ident ical to  xd or t here 
is at least o ne int ersectio n. Suppose that xs (t*) = xd (t*) . 
Fro m  t he necessary co nditio ns 
(A.44) 
and 
(A . 4 5 )  
Hence 
(A . 4 6 )  
x = -r(p -C') d C" 
x 
s 
rE [ u '  (7f) (p-C')] 
E [ u 1 1(11 )  (p-C 1 ) 2 - u ' (11 ) C"] 
. l 2 xd - xs = r E(p) E [ u'(n ) ]  - E [ pu '(11) ] - E(p-C ' ) E [u"(n ) (p-C') ] / Ii
2 where Ii = C"E [ u" (n ) (p-C ' ) - u' (11 )C" ] < 0 
Observe that the f irst t wo terms in t he numerato r  of (A . 4 6 )  can be rewrit ten 
as E(11) E [u' (11 ) ]  - E [ nu' (11 ) ) . 
However since. g (11 )  = nu ' (11 ) is co nvex 
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(A.4 7 ) E [ g (n ) ] > g [ E (11 ) ]  
by Jensen's inequalit y. Thus the numerator o f  (A.4 6 )  i s  po sit ive so 
that (A. 4 6 )  is negat iv e . 
P roof of Theo rem IV.lb: Since fixed co sts are po sitive depletion dates 
are f init e ;  also , since r = 0,  o pt imal rate s  are co nstant. Fo llo wing 
the proof of  Theorem III.l(ii) equat io n (IV.3) can be r ewritten as 
(A.48) 'C(x) - xC' (x) = E [ u(11 ) - nu ' (n) ]/ E [ u ' (11 ) )  
fo r x = x . In view of the concavity of u ,  (A . 48 )  is positive , establishing s 
the first conc lusion .  
Fo r the second part observe that g(11) convex implies u ' (n ) convex.
Thus by Jensen ' s inequalit y 
(A . 49) E[ u ' (ir ) J ::_ u' [ E (ir ) ] 
for all x > 0 .  Likewise g(ir) . co nvex implies u(ir) -g (n )  co ncave so t hat
(A . SO) E [ u(ir ) - iru' (ir) ] � u [ E(ir) ] - E(ir) u'[E(ir ) ]
for  al l x > 0.  
At the ut ility maximiz ing output ,  x ,  (A . 6)  can be r.ewrit ten as
(A.51 ) u'[ E(ir ) ] [C(x) - xC'(x) ] = u[ E (ir ) ] - E(ir) u'[ E(ir) ] 
where E(p) is equal to determinist ic price .  In view o f  (A . 4 9 ) , (A . 5 0 ) , 
and (A.51) 
(A. 52) E [ u' (ir ) ]  [ C (x) - xC' (x) ] :::_ E [ u(ir )  - u ' (11) )
at x,  o r  alternat ively, 
(A.53) 
at x.  
E[u'(ir) (p-C' (x) )] E[u
(ir) ] > O x -
Since (A.53) is decreasing in x, x > x co nclud ing the proof . s 
Proof o f  Theo rem IV. 2 :  The proof fo llows t he same format a s  Theo rem III. 2 
with expected values replac ing determinist ic values and hence is omitted. 
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Proof  o f  Co rollary IV. 2 :  The proof follo ws directly from that o f · 
Theo rem IV.2 . 
l'ro o f  o f  Theo rem IV.3(i) : The p ro o f  is simila r  to that o f  Theorem IH.3b.  
Since p > C ' (x* )+A and x < x* , we o bserve that p-C' (x )-A> 0 and 11 > O .  s . s 
Hence (A.18)  anq (A. 1 9 )  in the proof o f  T heorem III.3 b still hold . 
Letting 
(A. 54) a(1I) = u(11 -: �) 
when x = i , we can rewrite (A. 24) and (A.25) in view o f  (A. 54) . Taking s . 
expectations yield s 
(A.55) E [au ' (11) (p-C' (x) ) ] < E [u ' (11 - Ax) (p-C' (x) - A) ] 
and 
(A.56) E [au(11 ) ] = E [u (11 - Ax) ] x x 
at x . s Similar to Theorem lII. 3 b, (A.55) , (A.56) , and (IV . 3) imply that
Ci > x s - s 
Pro o f  o f  Theo rem IV . 3(ii) : Conditions corr�sponding to (IV . 3 )  imply t hat 
Ci satis f ies 
s 
(A. 57) E [u ' (11 - Ax) (p-C '(x) _ A) ] = E [u(11 - Ax) ] . x 
Diff erentiating (A ; 5 7 )  totally with. respect to A and so lving for o x/ a A  
yields 
(A. 58 )  ax E [ u " (11 - Ax) ] llA = E [li] 
2 where ti "'.  u11 (11 - Ax )  · [p-C ' (x) - Al x - xC" (x) u'  (11 - Ax) . Clearly 3 x/ o A> 0 
and the theorem is pro ved. 
Proof of Theorem IV . 4 :  The proof is similar to that o f  Theorem III. 4b.
Fo r  a part icular· value of 11 let b(11 ) be the number such t hat 
(A. 59) . u (y11 ) x 
b _(11 ) u(11) 
x 
A-1 0  
at x = x , where y s (1-D ) · and D · fs the tax rate.  By  the lemma o f  Theorem 
III .4b and the proof o f  Theo rem III. 4b 
(A.60) du('ll" ) du (y11 ) < b (11) � d11 -
for x = x and any value of p. In view of the non-negat ivit y of p-C , .(x)s 
· ·and hence 11 , and in light of ( IV. 3 ) , taking expectat ions o ver (A. 5 9 )
and (A. 6 0) yields 
(A . 61) E [u ' (y11 )  (p-C' (x) ) ] < E [u(y11 ) ] - x 
at x = .x • By analog y  with Theorem III . 4 b, we conclude that d" < x . s . . s - s 
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